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World Affairs
Wntr, 2002

Prospects for further military intervention in Melanesian politics.(Political Development in the Pacific)

Author/s: John Henderson

Melanesia has increasingly emerged as the unstable and violent part of an otherwise generally peaceful Oceania. (1) Bougainville's long war of secession from Papua New Guinea, the civil war in the Solomon Islands, East Timor's struggle for independence, and the growing conflict in West Papua have formed a violent backdrop for Melanesian politics. (2) In this article we seek to draw on the political science literature to analyze an increasing trend of military interventions in Melanesian politics, the prospects for this trend's continuing, (3) and the effects of military intervention on political and economic development. We do this in the context of Fiji's May and September 1987 military coups, May 2000 coup, and November 2000 army mutiny; the armed takeover of the Solomon Island government in June 2000; the March 1997 and March 2001 army mutinies in Papua New Guinea; and the rebellion of the armed forces in Vanuatu in 1996. (4)

In this article we define a coup as the seizure or attempted seizure of political power by the armed forces and/or police force, or sections thereof. It does not necessarily involve the overthrow of democratic government. Indeed, the literature on civil-military relations shows that many coups involve the replacement of one military regime with another. (5) For an armed coup to succeed, political power must be seized. Mutinies and rebellions defy the authority of the civilian government, and possibly the military command, but only become coup attempts when their objective is to take over the government. Although we focus here on coups, we also consider other, lesser forms of military intervention, as these can develop into coups.

We group our analysis around three factors contributing to the likelihood of military intervention: the capacity, disposition, and opportunity for the military or police to forcibly enter the political realm. We then examine factors inhibiting military intervention. It is the balance between causal factors and inhibitors that determines whether or not military intervention is initiated and succeeds. As S. E. Finer observed in a classic study of coups, military intervention is "a product of two sets of forces--the capacity and propensity of the military to intervene, and conditions in the society in which it operates." (6)

CAPACITY TO INTERVENE

Available Armed Forces

To mount a coup the basic requirement is the existence of armed forces, police, or militia willing and able to attempt to remove the government. The number of rebellious forces is less important than their determination and the skill of their leaders. Experience in previous coups may be important. The presence of strategically located personnel willing to take part is also vital. (7)

Until the first Fiji coup in May 1987, the Pacific island region was unique among regions emerging from colonial rule, as it had not experienced any military takeovers of government. But the primary reason for that was simple: few Pacific Island states possessed military or paramilitary forces. (Tonga is the only island state outside Melanesia to have armed forces.) It was no accident that the island state with the most effective and disciplined forces--Fiji--had the region's first military coup. Fiji has maintained armed forces with 3,400 active personnel. The Papua New Guinea Defense Force (PNGDF) numbers 4,400. (8) Vanuatu has a much smaller paramilitary Police Field Force of around three hundred.

A coup may, of course, be mounted with a small number of people. In Fiji both Sitiveni Rabuka's and George Speight's coups were mounted by a small squad of armed rebels. However, as Speight discovered after carrying out the coup, larger forces may be required to sustain the takeover. Speight and his backers gambled on the rest of the armed forces' joining the rebellion once Parliament had been taken over. That never happened.

It should be noted that the absence of an armed force does not provide any assurance against an armed takeover. As the June 2000 armed uprising in the Solomon Islands demonstrated, police as well as military forces may seek to mount or be part of a coup. The Solomon's armed takeover of government was mounted by what was referred to as the "joint forces," consisting of police and units of an irregular militia group, the Malaitan Eagle Force. The force had been formed to protect the interests of Malaitans who had moved to the Solomon capital, Honiara, on the island of Guadalcanal. Rival militia from Guadalcanal, the Isatabu Freedom Force, had sought to force Malaitans to leave Guadalcanal, where they monopolized key jobs in business and the civil service--including the police. (9)

There have been other Melanesian examples of police involvement in coups. In March 1990 the Papua New Guinea police chief, Paul Tohian, announced over the police radio his intention to mount a coup. But his courage had been overfortified by alcohol at a barbecue, and he was promptly arrested for staging what was then dubbed the "barbe-coup"! Tohian and two other senior police officers were charged with treason, but the charges were not pursued. (10)

In Papua New Guinea there has been a long history of strained relations between the police and the armed forces. In both 1997 and 2001 the police helped contain the army mutinies and prevent them from escalating into political takeover attempts. No such contrast between police and military appears to be evident in Fiji. Indeed, the police involvement in the May 2000 Fiji coup is still shrouded in controversy. Although an investigation cleared the police chief, Isikia Savua, of being a key supporter of reputed coup leader George Speight, suspicion remains that he may have been the leader behind the scenes. This is despite the fact that the police force is more balanced in its ethnic composition between Fijians and Indo-Fijians than the Fijian-dominated military.

Cohesion and Mood of Forces

The capacity to intervene also relates to the cohesion and mood of the forces that seek to overthrow a government. Cohesion is particularly important. If the forces are divided, then they have less of a chance of success. If the coup does succeed, the divisions may result in a countercoup, or a mutiny from disaffected forces. Divisions within the PNGDF, for instance, make it likely that any successful coup would be followed by a countercoup. Indeed, lack of cohesion helps explain why a military coup has not yet taken place in Papua New Guinea. The divisions--which reflect the fragmented nature of Papua New Guinea society in general--act to check possible politically motivated moves by the military. Justice Minister Jack Genia has commented that his country's ethnic diversity provides natural checks and balances that would neutralize any plans for a coup. (11)

In 1987 the Fiji armed forces remained, with few exceptions, united behind Rabuka's coup. But Speight's 2000 coup revealed deep divisions within the Fiji military. The success of Speight's takeover of the parliamentary complex in Suva and his holding of members of Parliament as hostages was dependent on the direct support of an elite counter-revolutionary warfare unit. It never was, as Speight liked to claim, a "civil" coup. Other sections of the military generally supported Speight's declared goal of ensuring Fijian paramountcy, but not necessarily his methods, and especially not his taking parliamentarians hostage. Speight was also a largely unknown quantity, as he came from a business, not military, background. (12) It was division in the military that, along with the desire to avoid bloodshed, explains the reluctance of the military command to end the hostage crisis in Parliament by force.

The depth of the divisions in the military created by the Speight coup became apparent after the hostages had been released and Speight had been charged with treason and imprisoned. In November 2000 the armed forces that remained loyal to Speight staged a mutiny at the main Queen Elizabeth barracks in Suva and attempted to assassinate the military commander, Commodore Frank Bainimarama. The mutiny was firmly suppressed, but only after fighting and casualties. Had it succeeded, it would likely have resulted in a full coup and a change of both military and political leadership. Following the failed mutiny, Bainimarama, who came from the small Fijian navy, firmly established himself as the head of the armed forces and backer of the military-appointed civilian government headed by Laisenia Qarase.

The mood of the military is also important. As Finer has observed, part of the mindset necessary for the military to embark on military intervention is the belief that it is superior to the civilian government. A sense of a special and separate identity--perhaps even from other forces in the country--is an important aspect of the psychology of soldiers carrying out a coup. (13) This appears to have been the case in both the Fiji coups and the 1997 Papua New Guinea army mutiny. It is significant that in both cases it was highly trained special force units that took the leading role. Following the 1987 Fiji coups, the former chief of staff, Jim Sanday, expressed concern at the growing politicization of the military, and especially the tendency of military officers to see themselves as upholders of the postcoup constitution and of chiefly interests. (14)

Leadership

Leadership is highly relevant to the capacity of the armed forces to intervene in politics. As Rabuka demonstrated in 1987, a determined leader can achieve much with a few loyal and disciplined supporters, and a charismatic style of leadership helps to sustain a coup. But Speight, who had apparently been chosen to front the May 2000 Fiji coup because of his media skills, demonstrated that charisma alone is not enough. Military skills and judgment are also required. In March 2001 the failure of the PNGDF mutiny to proceed with its wider political goals can be explained in large part by the lack of effective leadership. The mutineers lacked even a spokesperson to argue their case to the media.

DISPOSITION TO INTERVENE

More important than the capacity to intervene is the willingness to do so. What factors make military and police forces feel disposed toward intervention in the political process? In this section we will examine the following factors: the military's corporate interests; the individual interests of key figures; ethnic, regional or class divisions; experience with previous coups or rebellions; the influence of other regional coups; and the military's own concept of the national interest.

Corporate Interests

The surest way for a government to provoke a coup or mutiny is to threaten the military's corporate interests. This may be precipitated by undue political interference in the military's "autonomy"; by the establishment of rival armed forces, including palace guards, that remove the military's monopoly on weaponry; or by a reduction in the military budget. (15) In his research of coups worldwide from 1946 to 1970, William Thompson found that 23 percent involved "corporate positional grievances" relating to perceived threats to the military's autonomy, hierarchy, monopoly over weaponry, cohesion, honor, or political position. A larger number--33 percent--related to "corporate resource grievances," which included grievances over such issues as pay, promotions, and appointments; budget allocations or perceived interservice favoritism; and military policy, or degree of support for operations during times of war, insurgency, or maintenance of domestic order. (16)

Papua New Guinea provides a series of examples of how the protection of corporate interests has given rise to mutinies and rebellions, but as yet no coups. In March 2001 army mutinies took place at the military barracks in the capital, Port Moresby, following news that the government had accepted the recommendation of a group of commonwealth experts to cut the size of the PNGDF in half and to sell military real estate. Although the government quickly reversed its decision and agreed to consult with the military over the implementation of any proposed reforms, the demands of the mutineers expanded to address political issues such as the role of the World Bank in Papua New Guinea affairs. Those latter demands were eventually dropped, but the episode illustrates how corporate demands can escalate to political demands.

The earlier 1997 revolt by the PNGDF over the employment of the Sandline International mercenary force for operations in Bougainville was also in large part motivated by a desire to protect corporate interests. Wounded pride was also a factor. The mercenaries were to take the lead in a task the PNGDF had failed completely--to defeat the rebels in Bougainville. But what really hurt the PNGDF was the government's willingness to spend over U.S. $30 million on the mercenary force when the PNGDF was starved for even basic supplies. As General Jerry Singirok, the PNGDF commander, later told a commission of inquiry, insufficient funding had resulted in "very low" morale among the troops. He also expressed concern that Prime Minister Julius Chan was planning to establish his own palace guard. Singirok objected strongly to what he referred to as the creation of a "private army" to protect politicians, who meanwhile rendered the legitimate defense force nonoperational. (17)

There are earlier examples of the PNGDF's taking direct action to protect its corporate interests. In 1988 it successfully defied the government's directive to close the Lae Air Force Base. In March 1989, three to four hundred angry soldiers marched on Parliament demanding a pay increase that they believed was overdue. (18) The government quickly agreed. More seriously, during the long and bloody Bougainville conflict, there were several instances of the military's failing to follow Cabinet decisions, instead deciding what operations it would carry out, and when.

We find similar examples in other Melanesian states of the military's intervening in politics to defend its corporate interests. The 1996 rebellion in Vanuatu is a clear case of the paramilitary forces taking illegal action--including the brief detention of the president and acting prime minister--to ensure the payment of allowances and other outstanding pay. One cause (although not the major one) of the May 1987 coup in Fiji was the military's concern that the new Labor coalition government would not maintain the previous government's level of support for the armed forces. There was also concern about the new government's intention to launch a wide-ranging inquiry into corruption among government agencies, including the armed forces.

Individual Interests

The personal interests of those who contemplate or lead a coup may help explain their actions. These may relate to ambition, prestige, money or other individual interests. (19) In 1987 the Papua New Guinea military commander, Ted Diro, headed off possible disciplinary action against him by making it clear that his sacking would spark a coup. (20) In Fiji, Rabuka's military career was certainly boosted by his successful May 1987 coup. At the time of the coup he was the third-ranking officer; his prospects for promotion were not good and were not helped by his lack of chiefly status. He had unsuccessfully sought senior appointments outside the military in both the police and civil service. (21) Following the coup he quickly promoted himself from lieutenant colonel to major general and head of the military. Rabuka may also have been concerned about the revival of court-martial proceedings against him for disobeying orders during peacekeeping service in the Middle East. The September 1987 coup may also have been related to Rabuka's desire to ensure that he was not put on trial for treason for carrying out the May coup.

George Speight also had a strong personal motivation for leading the coup in May 2000. The previous week he had appeared in a Suva court on charges of currency violations, and he was due to face further charges. His financial fortunes had collapsed with the election of Mahendhra Chaudhry's government, and he had been declared bankrupt. The overthrow of the Chaudhry government would have given Speight considerable personal satisfaction and may have revived his financial prospects.

Previous Intervention

A further factor influencing the military's willingness to intervene is its previous inclination to challenge or breach civilian supremacy over the process of government. One coup can make it more likely that further coups will take place in that country. In Fiji's case the second coup followed within a few months of the first, but still with Rabuka very much in command. Thirteen years elapsed before the third coup was mounted by Speight, who cited the precedent set by Rabuka's coup to legitimize his own action. The possibility remains of further coups--or perhaps countercoups--in Fiji. It is ironic that Speight claimed that the armed forces' assertion of military rule a week after his own insurrection in effect amounted to a coup within a coup.

The same principle applies to mutinies and other acts of military defiance. In Papua New Guinea four years elapsed between the 1997 and 2001 army mutinies. It is likely that the time lapse before the next mutiny will be considerably less.

The prior behavior of key individuals can provide an important clue as to their readiness to challenge constitutional rule. In Vanuatu former prime minister Barak Sope has a background that includes an illegal "constitutional coup" in 1988. This occurred when Sope had President Sokumanu (his uncle) swear him in as prime minister, although there was no constitutional basis for so doing. Both subsequently served short periods in jail for treason before being released on appeal. In April 2001, this time as the legally installed prime minister, Sope again indicated that he was prepared to act beyond the constitution to remain in power when he contemplated declaring a state of emergency rather than face a vote of no confidence in Parliament. The emergency powers would have given him power over the paramilitary forces, in effect constituting a coup. But it is unlikely that he could have commanded the loyalty of these forces. In the end court orders forced the parliamentary vote, and Sope was defeated. In fairness to Sope, it should be acknowledged that he is not alone in the turbulent world of Vanuatu politics in contemplating unconstitutional means to gain or retain power. (22)

The literature on coups suggests that a successful coup may well provoke further coups in the same region. (23) The June 2000 armed takeover in the Solomon Islands, coming just over two weeks after the Speight coup in Fiji, was widely dubbed a copycat coup. But in the case of the Solomon Islands, the Speight coup probably affected the timing but not the occurrence of the rebellion. As noted below, the causes were of a more fundamental nature, relating mainly to ethnic strife. "Copying" could only take place if other determining factors were present.

Ethnic and Regional Divisions

The literature on military intervention identifies ethnic and regional differences as possible causes of coups. But these should not be overemphasized; a study of coups in the period 1946-70 found that only 3 percent were in response to a perceived threat to ethnic or regional interests. (24) Nevertheless, in Melanesia ethnic divisions have been a major factor behind coups and rebellions. The Fiji Army, which is overwhelmingly made up of indigenous Fijians, has long considered that it had the special mission of defending Fijian and chiefly interests. A former chief of staff noted that the wearing of the Fijian sulu (or skirt) on ceremonial occasions underlined the ethnic identity of the force. (25) Both Rabuka and Speight justified their respective coups on the grounds of protecting the rights of Fijians against the political and economic encroachment of the immigrant Indo-Fijian population. Their claims were overly simplistic--indeed misleading in many respects--but nevertheless boosted their popular appeal.