OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 1 2003
The
Solomon Islands Townsville Peace Agreement: Trading Human Rights for Peace?
John Selwyn Taupongi*, Alan Christian Siale*, Toepenina Hekau*,
Atrocities in Solomon Islands (1998 - 2000)
and the Townsville Peace Agreement: Trading human rights for Peace?
By John Selwyn Taupongi*, Alan Christian
Siale*, Toepenina Hekau*,
Impunity for the torture, rape and killing of civilians, including
children, is an outrage and contributes nothing to lasting peace or
reconciliation. Sweeping amnesties haven't brought peace in other conflicts and
are likely to cast a deep shadow on the future of human rights in Solomon
Islands.
Amnesty International, Solomon
Islands: A Black Day for Human Rights.
INTRODUCTION
After two years of conflict in the Solomon Islands (SI), matters
between the two warring parties (Malaitans and Guadalcanal people) were finally
“settled” in Townsville, Australia in October 2000. In Townsville, militants
from both sides, the government and witnesses from other neutral provinces of the
SI came together and drafted the Townsville
Peace Agreement 2000 (‘TPA’). A ceasefire
was secured among the warring factions through
the TPA. Notwithstanding the possible contribution of TPA to the conflict/peace
process in SI, it turned a blind eye to the atrocities that were committed by
the militants especially on Guadalcanal and in Honiara). Instead of addressing
that issue the TPA grants immunity to former militants for any crimes or civil
wrongs they might have committed during the virtual civil war in the SI.
In a sense, the TPA was designed as a quick fix solution: to get
cease-fire – perhaps at all costs. This paper will examine whether human rights
were sacrificed in trying to attaining peace in the SI by means of the TPA. To that end, this paper first describes the
atrocities that were committed (by militants) between 1998 and 2000. They are
particularly examined in the context of breaches of international human rights.
A brief discussion of relevant international human rights laws and instruments
is made here. The provisions of the TPA which afforded a blanket immunity are
compared with other agreements similar in nature. This comparative analysis is
made to give a more complete picture of the application of such immunity and
its implications in the context of the SI. The last part of this paper looks at
the adverse impact that such immunity (TPA) might have or already has on human
rights in SI.
A: THE ETHNIC CONFLCIT IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS AND ENSUING ATROCITIES
(I)
The Ethnic Conflict in the Solomon Islands[1]:
The civil war in Solomon Islands has its
origins in a set of demands that were
made by the Guadalcanal people to the central (or) national government of the
SI since the year 1978. In 1987, the Guadalcanal people (as they are known in the
Solomon Islands) petitioned the government in response to continuous brutal
killings of their people by migrants (from other parts of the SI) to their
areas. Among others, they called for a federal system of government in issues
relating to revenue sharing, migration and settlements. As a result of the
national government not responding to these requests the law and order
situation began to deteriorate rapidly from about 1998.
In November of 1998 a group of armed indigenous
Guadalcanal men attacked Malaitan settlements on Guadalcanal which destroyed
properties in the settlements. The Guadalcanal men also chased out the settlers from the settlements.
In 2000, a group representing displaced Malaitans
formed an armed group called the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF). Among others, its
main objective was to retaliate for previous and perceived wrongs that were
committed against them. The MEF made
incursions into neighbouring villages on Guadalcanal and killed a number of
people. Armed confrontations between the two groups escalated further in March
2000.
On June 5 2000 MEF joined forces with elements
of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Paramilitary Wing, took over the state
armoury and staged a coup. This did not deter the determination of Isatabu
Freedom Movement (IFM) who apposed the MEF.
Fierce fighting ensued between these groups. Starting from that period
and until the signing of the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) both sides
committed atrocities and human rights violations.
(a)
By
Harold Keke (Guadalcanal Warlord)
(b)
By
members of the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM)
(d)
By
members of the Malaita Eagle Force/ Joint Operation (MEF)
(III)
International
Human Rights Law:
(a)
The
Basis for the Application of Universal Human Rights Laws:
Generally and especially in recent years
international law have increasingly been used to deal with the internal affairs
or conflicts within a nation. For instance, in Prosecutor v Tadic[14], which dealt specifically with the application
of international law in internal conflicts, Tadic (the defendant – a
public official) argued inter alia that
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTFY), which
tried him, did not have the jurisdiction ratione materiae to deal with
matters of internal conflicts. In rejecting this contention, The Appeals
Chamber stated that:
[T]he
emergence of international rules governing internal strife has occurred at two
different levels: at the level of customary law and at that of the treaty law”[15] [and that] the general
essence of those rules…has become applicable to internal conflicts[16]. [Moreover] it cannot be
denied that customary rules have developed to govern internal strife. These
rules…cover such areas as protection of civilians from hostilities, in
particular from indiscriminate attacks, protection of all those who do not (no
longer) take active part in hostilities…[17]
In relation to international or universal human
rights, it has also been established in various international law cases that notwithstanding
state sovereignty, universal human rights laws may have force (and therefore
could be applied) in a nation. The implementation and application of
international human rights law can
either be achieved under an
existing human rights treaty/convention/covenant to which that nation is a
party or under customary international (human rights) law even if that nation
is not a party to a relevant treaty/convention[18]. In SI, the relevant conventions under which
human rights may be applied would be those dealing with war crimes (The 1949 Geneva Conventions read with the1977 Additional Protocols ). In
addition, customary international law relating to crimes against humanity
provides the basis for the application of certain universal human rights norms in
the Solomon Islands. These are considered below.
(b)
Applicable
Conventions: Non-International Conflicts
The Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva
Convention
Article 3 treats the following as violations of
human rights: Violence to life, health and physical or mental well being of
persons; Collective punishment; Taking of hostages; Acts of terrorism; Outrages
upon personal dignity (including rape); and Extra-judicial executions[19].
(c)
Applicable
Customary Human Rights laws: Crimes Against Humanity
In the Nuremberg Judgments (1946)[20], crimes against humanity were defined and since
then, the contents of such international crimes have developed primarily
through customary international law. These have taken ‘codified’ form in the Statutes
of two current international criminal tribunals: the ICTFY and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and these could be juxtaposed and analysed
vis-à-vis the events of the civil conflict in the SI. Crimes against humanity
are crimes “committed in armed conflict, whether internationally or internal in
character”[21], and “directed against any civilian population
on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds” [22]. These include (but are not restricted to): murder, deportation, torture, rape; and persecutions
on political, racial and religious grounds[23].
(d)
Specific
violations:
In Prosecutor v Akayesu[24] the
Chamber defined rape as “a
physical invasion of a sexual nature, which is committed on a person under
circumstances which are coercive [that] … must be committed as part of
widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population on certain catalogued
discriminatory grounds, namely: national, ethnic, political, racial, or
religious grounds”[25].
The United Nations Security Council has, through
certain resolutions, that were unanimously adopted, affirmed the spirit of the Tadic Case and
the Nuremberg judgments by
stating that those issuing orders for acts that result in violations of
international humanitarian laws can also be held to be criminally responsible. For instance in
Somalia, while an internal civil strife was under way, the Security Council
unanimously condemned breaches of international humanitarian laws and stated
that the authors of such breaches or those who had ordered their commission (in
that case Faraey Adid the Somali Warlord) would be held ‘individually
responsible’ for them[26].
As a warlord who is reported (see above) to have
committed atrocities , Mr. Keke could be held responsible (individually liable)
for the acts of his ‘boys’ in the same way the Somali warlord Adideed (above)
was held responsible under the U.N.S.C. Res 794 (3rd December 1992)
and U.N.S.C Res. 814 (26th March 1993)[33]. His acts, such as repetitive and senseless
murder, political assassination and terrorising villages could also amount to
either war crimes or crimes against humanity (as outlined above) depending on
actual evidence and the full construction of the relevant conventions/laws
mentioned. The relevant conventions have been applied in the statute that
established the ICTR (Rwanda), which in turn, gave jurisdiction to that
tribunal to handle “internal” conflict and crimes committed by any “person”
(thus including, arguably, public officials and civilians).[34] A similar application in the SI would therefore
implicate Keke.
2.
Isatabu
Freedom Movement (IFM): leaders, commanders and actual wrongdoers
The displacement of 20,000 Malaitans from
Guadalcanal and the burning/looting of their properties by the IFM amount to
“persecution based on racial grounds”[35] (crime against humanity). Other atrocities such
as unlawful killings committed by members of the IMF against Malaitans would
fall under crimes against humanity and torture (described above).
3. Malaita
Eagle Force (MEF) & Para-Military Joint Operation: its leaders, commanders
and actual wrongdoers
Members of the MEF are responsible for
indiscriminate killing of Guadalcanal civilians and can therefore be held
liable for the violation of crimes against humanity such as murder, persecution
on racial grounds and torture[36]. Since some of the militants were police
officers, they could be held responsible as public officials (see below).
As described earlier, some SI police officers
tortured, raped and killed Guadalcanal civilians and destroyed their properties.
Again, first these acts are breaches of
the Additional Protocol II to the 1949
Geneva Convention, which protects victims of internal war from, amongst
others, violence to life and health, outrages upon dignity[37] and extra-judicial execution whilst torture
would be an additional violation under
treaty law[38] or customary international (torture) law (the Filartiga
Case).
PART
B: The Townsville Peace Agreement (IMMUNITY)
I. Putting the Immunity in Context:
Since the start of the ethnic conflict in the SI, various attempts
were made to attain peace[39] but nothing seemed to work; instead those responsible managed to
find scapegoats to take the blame for failed peace attempts. Finally, with the
assistance of the Australian government, representatives of the warring
parties, the Solomon Islands government and neutral witnesses met in Townsville
and through their deliberations, the Townsville
Peace Agreement was drafted and signed. The TPA generally called for
cease-fire and the end of all hostilities. However, as part of the incentive to
attain peace, the TPA not only provides continued employment of former police
officers who assisted either warring groups[40], but it also contains (para 3 of Part Two) the following:
o
Weapons Amnesty for former militants – for them to return weapons and in return, they would be granted
immunity in respect of any prosecution related to the theft and illegal use of
the guns.
o
General amnesty for crimes committed – this grants immunity for former militants as well as members of
the police force who may have participated in any military operations during
the civil conflict, from criminal prosecution. This amnesty therefore expressly
extends to crimes relating to the eviction of Malaitans from Guadalcanal
villages, the retaliation by Malaitans and the coup of 5 June 2000. It also
covers any crime be it connected to guns and ammunition, criminal damage to
property or violation of traffic laws.
o
Amnesty for civil liabilities – this grants immunity to members
of the former warring parties from any civil liability or disciplinary action
that could have been attributed to them based on their actions during the civil
conflict.
In response to the TPA, the Parliament enacted (on December 19
2000) the Amnesty Act 2000, which has been termed as “a blanket amnesty
law for virtually all crimes and human rights abuses committed during the
two-year ethnic conflict”[41]. Thus, both the TPA and the amnesty
Act put into motion perhaps the most sweeping amnesty to be seen in a peace
agreement. A comparison with two other peace agreements would illustrate this point.
Comparison may be drawn from a conflict in Eastern Europe and its
resolution. After years of war and the commission of atrocities and violations of human rights, the war in the former
Yugoslavia was finally “settled” under the Dayton Peace Agreement 1995 (‘DPA’). That agreement
similarly called for the end of all hostilities, the disarmament of warring
factions, the disbanding of all groups involved[42], the exchange of prisoners of war[43] and the cooperation of previous warring groups[44]. However, whilst the TPA granted complete amnesty for violations
of human rights for former militants, Dayton recognised “that the
observance of human rights and the protection of displaced persons are of vital
importance in achieving lasting peace”[45] and therefore provides for the arrest and handing over of those
indicted for human rights violations to the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia[46].
The second peace agreement that may be contrasted with the TPA is
the Bougainville Peace Agreement
(‘BPA’). In brief the Bougainville Crisis, which lasted for about 10 years,
involved three groups: the rebels (who opposed the Papua New Guinea (PNG)
government’s involvement in the island’s affairs), the PNG government and
military and the Resistance Fighters (funded by PNG). Atrocities were also
committed by all sides. Cease-fire was finally reached under the Lincoln Agreement and later, in the BPA,
amnesty was granted to former combatants under the following terms:
The BPA states that:
The parties confirm that grants of amnesty and pardon (as agreed
in the Lincoln Agreement) for all
persons involved in crisis-related activities or convicted of offences arising
out of crisis-related activities should be expedited, and will cooperate to
ensure that they are[47].
The Lincoln Agreement provides:
The Papua New Guinea National Government will:-
(b) grant amnesty to persons involved in crisis-related activities on
all sides;
(c) Following receipts of advice from the Advisory Committee on the
Power of Mercy, recommend pardons for persons convicted of crisis-related
offences[48].
It is apparent that the language and tenor of these peace
documents (Bougainville) are not as sweeping all-encompassing as compared to
those of the TPA (SI). The BPA (read in
conjunction with the Lincoln Agreement)
still allows room for interpretation against ex-combatants. Moreover, amnesty
though promised can be described as a “future option” (notice the words “should
be expedited”) in the same way aspirations are whilst grants of pardon also
seems to be subject to the advice of a committee. Lastly, unlike the TPA, there
appears to be no immunity from civil liabilities in the BPA.
II. The Application (and extent) of
the TPA Immunity:
In practice, the difference between the DPA, the BPA and the TPA
as well as the extent of the amnesty provided for in both the BPA and the TPA
may be seen in the treatment of wartime leaders. Notwithstanding Dayton, the
former Head of State of Yugoslavia was indicted and is now currently (July
2003) being tried in the ICTFY. Moreover, because of the DPA, other war
criminals have been indicted, tried and convicted[49]. In other words, Dayton does
not retrospectively and fully sanction crimes and human rights violations
during the crisis in former Yugoslavia. Instead
the DPA has been used to effect major socio-economic and political changes in
the former Yugoslavia.
The BPA, on the other hand, concerns mainly the granting of
autonomy to Bougainville. Hence the amnesty and pardon sections are merely
ancillaries to bigger issues such as changes to the Constitution of PNG, the
government and judiciary of Bougainville and the disposal of weapons. Like the
DPA, the BPA mainly addresses political issues and the erstwhile rebellion by
Bougainvilleans of the PNG government. The fact that former rebels now have a
place in the Bougainville government is not so much a result of the amnesty
granted under the BPA and the Lincoln Agreement, as it is a result of the
granting of some form of autonomy to Bougainville by PNG.
In contrast to both the DPA (former Yugoslavia) and the BPA
(Bougainville), the TPA (SI) was drafted in relation to an internal ethnic
conflict that was not a war for independence per se. Although there are some provisions relating to autonomy,
social and development financial assistance and land issues, the TPA is
concerned mainly with peace, reconciliation, amnesty, demilitarization, lost
lives/properties and the laying down of arms.
Hence, the amnesty provided for by the TPA and echoed in the Amnesty Act 2000 (SI) was a major
objective of the TPA, which has been applied fully.
For instance, the instigator of the 2000 SI Coup retained his
licence to practice as a lawyer. In addition, the former Secretary of the Joint
Operation that was responsible for the Coup was elected as (and is currently) a
Minister of the Cabinet[50]. Again, despite reported atrocities committed by the MEF, IFM and
a lot of police officers[51], about 1000 ex-militants were recruited by the police force as
special constables[52] whilst the post-coup government attempted to turn the
para-military element of the police force (most of the officers of the police
force took part in illegal activities as well) into an army fully subsidized by tax-payers’ money[53]. Further, even police officers with “tainted” records remain in
the force, as indeed this is allowed under the TPA. In other words, the atrocities outlined earlier, have been
treated as if they were never committed.
The only avenue to deal with lost lives under the TPA is
customary. The TPA provides that “[c]ustom
means of reconciliation and compensation may be agreed to between concerned
persons and communities in connection with killing of persons during the course
of the crisis[54]”. This provision is too optimistic and forgets
that customary reconciliation and compensation have been used to no avail prior
to and during the civil conflict.
One further point should be mentioned. Apart
from the amnesty provisions, most of the TPA is yet to be applied or
implemented. The TPA calls for the return of guns but to date, ex-militants
hang on to their weapons[55]. The TPA declared peace and harmony and yet
further killings followed, the latest being the murder of a former police
commissioner in early 2003[56]. The point here is that the TPA provides for
various objectives but so far, it seems that the only part of that Agreement that has been applied fully (to the
benefit of former militants) is that relating to amnesty and immunity from
crimes and civil wrongs. The fact that the only follow-up (to the TPA)
legislation enacted is the Amnesty Act
2000 is quite indicative of this point.
It is one thing for individuals to violate the
human rights of others but it is a completely different (and perhaps more
deplorable) thing to “wash out” such violations using laws. Both the TPA and
the subsequent Amnesty Act 2000 of the
SI contributed to this complete “wash out” and retrospective and all-covering
“immunity” for blatant violations of international humanitarian and
international human rights laws. Here, both a peace treaty and an Act of
Parliament deliberately ignore or “immunize”
atrocities that, as shown in Part
A of this paper were not only serious
violations of human rights under conventional and customary international law
but also of international humanitarian laws as well.
The second effect of the TPA immunity is that it
“sent out a wrong signal … that criminals and cold-blooded murderers are left
to walk scot-free”[57]. This signal may be mistaken by former militants (as well
as other civilians) as legitimising or condoning the atrocities. It could also
be construed by the relatives and friends of those who were killed or injured
in the civil conflict to resort to “self-help” and perhaps even “revenge
killings”. This is quite evident in the deteriorating law and order situation
in the SI. As a result the people have lost their trust not only in the police
and law enforcement authorities but also
in the entire machinery of government – if there was an effective one in
the first place. It is the authors’ belief that the TPA immunity has
contributed a lot to this loss of legitimacy of the institutions of the State.
Finally, one could argue that this same immunity
has created a ‘double standard’, where there is special treatment for
ex-militants and another for the rest. The greatest danger of this double
standard lies in the future – that is, it sets a bad precedent for future
conflicts. It goes without saying that should any conflict arise again, those
involved would have a “legitimate expectation” – in the non-technical and
non-administrative law sense of the words but in a figurative sense- that after
that conflict, immunity will – again - be granted.
In the final analysis, the immunity provisions
of the TPA sanctions or condones what
would otherwise be clear violations of
international humanitarian and human rights laws (past), gives the ‘green
light’ to further commit such violations
(in the present) and sets a bad precedent for the future. It is no wonder that
Amnesty International see the passing of the Amnesty Act as a “Black Day” for the Solomon Islands.[58]
CONCLUSION
In a nation where ‘human rights’ are an area of
confusion and are – to say the least- not well-respected, the immunity that Townsville Peace Agreement grants to
former militants and criminals may prove to be the “end of human rights” in the
Solomon Islands. The discussion in this paper indicates that first, certain
acts committed by these ex-militants would, had it not been for the TPA, be in
breach of humanitarian and human rights laws (treaty or customary). Second, these
clear violations of human rights (including core rights to be free from murder,
torture and rape) have been “immunized” or ‘forgiven’ by the TPA without due
consideration of the likely repercussions. The amnesty granted under the TPA is indeed “sweeping” as compared to other peace
agreements and this has alarming implications for human rights perhaps not only
in the Solomon Islands but also in the South Pacific region. Not only does the
TPA sanction prior violations of human rights, but it also provides a firm
basis for the present and future disregard of human rights and the law
generally. Given these observations, one is justified in concluding that the
TPA did in fact and in law trade human rights for peace but, sadly, whilst that
peace (bought at such a high price) remains elusive -as can be seen in the
contemporaneous and ongoing events in the Solomon Islands- the irrevocable damage
to human rights has been done. In sum, the calculated sacrifice of human rights
for an elusive peace has achieved neither and this would be one of the
unfortunate legacies of the Townsville
Peace Agreement.
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Townsville Peace Agreement 2000
* Fourth Year Law Students,
** Lecturer,
[1]This a summary derived mostly from Nanau, G., “Uniting the Fragments: Solomon Islands Constitutional Reforms,” Symposium on Development Research, South Pacific Futures, Brisbane, 2002: 1 – 3.
[2]
Pareti, S., “Solomon Islands Politics of Letters: What really happened in the
Weathercoast Saga?” Islands Business, August 2002: 35
[3]
Pareti, S., “No end in Sight for Problems in the Hapi Isles,” Islands
Business, (September 2002) 32.
[4] Pareti, S., “Donors Shy Away from the
Solomons,”
[5]
Pareti, S., “Donors Shy Away from the Solomons,”
[6]
Keith-Reid, R., “Where to from Now? The daunting Challenges Mannaseh Sogavare
faces,” Islands Business, July 2000: 33
[7]
Keith-Reid, R., “Where to from Now? The daunting Challenges Mannaseh Sogavare
faces,” Islands Business, July 2000: 33
[8]
Pareti, S., “Donors Shy Away from the Solomons,”
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11]
Keith-Reid, R., “Where to from Now? The daunting Challenges Mannaseh Sogavare
faces,” Islands Business, July 2000: 33
[12]
Keith-Reid, R., “Signs of Hope on the Long Road to Peace. Maybe: Economy’s
wrecked as Militias finally sign on,” Islands Business, August 2000: 33
[13]
Keith-Reid, R., “Signs of Hope on the Long Road to Peace. Maybe: Economy’s
wrecked as Militias finally sign on,” Islands Business, August 2000: 33
[14] Appeals Chamber, International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 1995 Case No.IT-94-1-AR72,
[15] Prosecutor v Tadic, Appeals Chamber,
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 1995 Case
No.IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995. Pp98 in http://www.un.org/city/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm
in H J Steiner and P Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law,
Politics, Morals, (2000) 1168.
[16] Prosecutor v Tadic, Appeals Chamber,
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 1995 Case
No.IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995. Pp126 in http://www.un.org/city/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm
in H J Steiner and P Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law,
Politics, Morals, (2000) 1166.
[17] Prosecutor v Tadic, Appeals Chamber,
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 1995 Case0
No.IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995. Pp127 in http://www.un.org/city/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm
in H J Steiner and P Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law,
Politics, Morals, (2000) 1166.
[18] See Distein, Y., “International Criminal Law”, 5 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, 55 (1975) 73 for a good summary of this position.
[19] Article 3 of Protocol II Additional
to the
[20] 41 Am.J.Int.L. 172 (1947), International Military Tribunal: cited in H J Steiner and P Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals, (2000): 115
[21] Article 5, Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, reprinted in 14 Hum.Rts.L.J. 211 (1993), cited in H J Steiner and P Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals, (2000): 1151
[22] Statute
of the International Tribunal for Rwanda reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1590 (1994)
cited in H J Steiner and P Alston, International Human Rights in Context:
Law, Politics, Morals, (2000) 1176.
[23] The list of Crimes Against Humanity is the same in both the Statutes of the ICTFY and the ICTR
[24] Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal
for
[25] Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal
for
[26] S.C. Res. 794 (
[27] Declaration
on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted
[28] Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted 10 Dec. 1948, entered into force 28 June 1987, G.A., Res. adopted 39/46, 39 UN GAOR, Supp. (No.51), UN Doc. A/39/51
[29] Article 1, Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, adopted 9 Dec. 1975, G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), 30 UN GOAR,
Supp. (No.34), UN Doc. A/10034, at 91
[30] Article 5, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted
[31] Article 3, Declaration on the Protection from
Torture 1975 (see footnote 29)
[32] 630 F 2nd 876 (1980) United States
Courts of Appeals, Second Circuit in M Dixon & R. McCorquodale, Cases
and Materials o International Law, Blackstone Press: London.pp.138
[33] The resolution stated that the authors of such breaches or those who ordered their commission would be held ‘individually responsible’ for them.
[34] Article 3, Statute of the International
Tribunal for
[35] Article 5, Statute of the ICTFY (see footnote 21)
[36] Article 5, Statute of the ICTFY (see above n 21)
[37] I.e., Rape would be an outrage to personal dignity under the Additional
Protocol II to the Geneva Convention 1948 as well as a human rights violation
under Prosecutor v Akayesu Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for
[38] Declaration on Protection from Torture, 1975 (see above n 27) and the Convention on Torture 1984 (see footnote 28)
[39] Including: The Honiara Peace
Accord dated
[40] See
[41] Amnesty International, “
[42] See Article II of the Military Aspect,
[43] Ibid, Article IX
[44] Ibid, Article X
[45] Article VII of the General Framework Section, DPA
[46] Article IX of the Military Aspect, DPA
[47] Article 331, Bougainville Peace
Agreement, In http://www.ecmi.de/cps/download/BougainvillePeace.pdf
(Accessed 07 May 2003), Emphasis added
[48] Under ‘Amnesty and Pardon’, Lincoln Agreement 1998, In http://rspas.anu.edu.au/melanesia/PDF/lincoln-agreement.pdf
(Accessed
[49] In fact, it was because of the
DPA that by 1993 (years later), two war-criminals had been convicted, two
trials were underway and three additional indictees were awaiting trial in The
Hague See
Ahmad, A., “Statement on Agenda 49 of the Report on the ICTFY,” In http://www.ictfy/reports (Accessed 05May
2003)
[50] Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade (Country Report) In http://www.austrade/country_information/SI.html
(Accessed 05 May 2003)
[51] See the Part A of this paper (above)
[52] Pareti, S., “Donors Shy Away from the
Solomons,”
[53] Editors, “Bishops, Bank Boss Question where
Solomons is heading: Spotlight on Government as Violence Continues,” Pacific
Islands Business, July 2001: 21
[54] Article 1 (b) of Part Three, Townsville Peace Agreement
[55] Pareti, S., “The
Hunt’s on for Rebel Harold Keke,” Islands Business, November 2002: 30
[56] Editors,
‘Whispers,’
[57] Pareti, S., “The Hunt’s on for Rebel Harold Keke,” Islands Business, November 2002: 30
[58] See footnote 41 (above).